Is the public key of the Coordinator hard coded into the current implementation of IRI? I can't find that part in the code.

  • This question could be of use. iota.stackexchange.com/q/1160/249
    – Phil-ZXX
    Jan 16, 2018 at 0:22
  • Thanks, it helps but doesn’t answer the question fully. My question is more along the lines of: How do we know, that the latest solid milestone info is valid and in fact originating from the COO? How is this verified?
    – ralf
    Jan 16, 2018 at 6:15

1 Answer 1


Yes, the public key (address) of the COO is hardcoded into the current implementation of IRI. Check out this line of code. Using this key IRI can determine if a transaction is a milestone or not.

  • The I don’t understand how it protects the network against somebody who could control a majority of the nodes. Couldn’t an attacker simply compile a version of IRI which accepts the attacker‘s „COO“ and run it on a majority of the nodes?
    – ralf
    Jan 16, 2018 at 15:02
  • It would basically mean a "fork" of the tangle (if I understood your question correctly). Of course an attacker can compile whatever he wants and deploy as many nodes as he can, but all "good" nodes will continue accept the IOTA's COO milestones (cause they use the official IRI from github, with official COO public key hardcoded in it) and reject any attacker's milestone (cause its signature doesn't correspond to the COO public key). So an attacker will live in his own world: with his own tangle, with a lot of his own nodes, but without any users.
    – alexpods
    Jan 16, 2018 at 16:11
  • I totally understand that part. My "problem" is: If somebody, who would own 50+ % of the network power, can easily fake the COO, too, how does the COO then protect the network against exactly this sort of attack?
    – ralf
    Jan 16, 2018 at 18:09

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